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GLOBALIZATION, RIGHTS, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Manoj Mate†
Abstract:
This article examines the broader and evolving role of the
Supreme Court of India in an era of globalization by examining the Court’s decisionmaking in rights-based challenges to economic liberalization, privatization, and
development policies over the past three decades. While the Court has been mostly
deferential in its review of these policies and projects, it has in many cases been active
and instrumental in remaking and reshaping regulatory frameworks, bureaucratic
structures, accountability norms, and in redefining the terrain of fundamental rights that
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other litigants have invoked in challenges
to these policies. This article argues that the Court has deployed rights as “structuring
principles” in order to evaluate and review liberalization and privatization policies, based
on constitutional or statutory illegality, arbitrariness or unreasonableness, or corruption,
and framed rights as “substantive-normative principles” to assess development policies.
This article argues that the Court’s particular approach to rights-based judicial review has
resulted in the creation of “asymmetrical rights terrains” that privilege the rights and
interests of private commercial and industrial stakeholders and government officials and
agencies, above the rights and interests of labor, villagers, farmers, and tribes. The article
concludes by suggesting that the Court’s approach to judicial review reflects a unique
model of adjudication in which high courts play an active role in shaping the meaning of
rights, regulatory structure and norms, and the legal-constitutional discourse of
globalization.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, globalization has fundamentally transformed
relationships between nation states as well as the terrain of domestic
political, constitutional, and regulatory frameworks that govern economic
and development policies, particularly in developing nations. 1 As part of
this global trend, developing nations have shifted from statist-socialist
policies toward economic liberalization, privatization, and development
policies in line with the broader globalization of the world economy. 2
International institutions and organizations, including the World Bank and
†

Associate Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science,
Whittier College. J.D., Harvard Law School, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley.
1
For scholarship on globalization, see generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF
GLOBALIZATION (2004); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Barbara HarrissWhite et al., Globalisation, Economic Citizenship and India’s Inclusive Developmentalism, in CITIZENSHIP
AS CULTURAL FLOW: STRUCTURE, AGENCY AND POWER (Subrata K. Mitra ed., 2012); Judith White,
Globalization, Divestment, and Human Rights in Burma, 14 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 47, 47–65 (2005).
2
See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial
Institutions, and the Third World, 32 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 243, 255–62 (2000); Kanishka Jayasuriya,
Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory
Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 425, 445 (1999).
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), have played a central role in pressuring
shifts toward economic reforms aimed at liberalization and privatization, and
in directly funding development projects. 3 These shifts have also helped
reshape and influence lawyering and legal practice, constitutional and policy
norms, and constitutional adjudication on these issues. 4
Internationally, there has been a resurgence of critical legal
scholarship regarding the impact of globalization on human rights and
constitutional adjudication. 5 While there has been significant opposition to
these policies within the political sphere in countries like India, much of the
contestation and challenge to these policies has also been through courtbased litigation. Indeed, because these policy shifts have often been
executive-led and effectuated with limited policy debates in Parliament,
opposition parties, grassroots groups and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have had no choice but to use the courts as the primary forum for
challenging and mobilizing oppositional support against globalization
policies of the government. 6 While a significant body of scholarship across
many disciplines has analyzed the spread of economic liberalization and
privatization policies globally, as well as challenges to these development
policies from the perspective of human rights, 7 less attention has been given
to the primary role that constitutional courts and high courts play in
reshaping the terrain of rights and regulatory structures.8
3
See generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD-WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) [hereinafter RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW FROM BELOW]; Shalini Randeria, Globalization of Law: Environmental Justice, World Bank, NGOs
and the Cunning State in India 51 CURRENT SOC. 305 (2003).
4
See, e.g., GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002); Terence C. Halliday and Pavel
Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447 (2006).
5
See, e.g., UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002); Surya Deva, Human Rights
Realization in an Era of Globalization: The Indian Experience, 12 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2006);
Upendra Baxi, Access to Justice in a Globalized Economy: Some Reflections, in INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE
GOLDEN JUBILEE 1956–2006, 27 (2007); Judith Resnick, Globalization(s), Privatization(s),
Constitutionalization, and Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 162 (2013).
6
See Ashutosh Varshney, Mass politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in
Comparative Perspective, 2 J. POL’Y REFORM 301 (1998); Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The
Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability, U.N. Doc. PP/DGHR/23 (Jan. 23, 2006), 22–29.
7
For recent scholarship on the intersection of globalization and human rights, see generally
RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3; Surya Deva, Human Rights Realization in
an Era of Globalization: The Indian Experience, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2006).
8
For an example of work that does explore how law and courts shape the regulatory context in
India, see Chiranjib Sen & Anil Suraj, The Role of Legal Process in the Redesign of Indian GovernmentBusiness Relations (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., and the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 102, 2009),
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22692/No_102_SenSuraj_Legal_Process_India_91909.pdf.
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This article analyzes the role that the Supreme Court of India has
played in adjudicating constitutional challenges to India’s globalization
policies. Specifically, it examines how the Court, through its decisions, has
reconstituted and reshaped constitutional and regulatory frameworks
governing economic liberalization and privatization policy and development
policy in India. Part II examines broader shifts in the Supreme Court’s
fundamental rights jurisprudence from the post-Emergency period to the
post-liberalization era.9 Part III analyzes how the Court has redefined the
scope and terrain of rights and judicial review and helped reshape and
reconstitute regulatory frameworks in the areas of liberalization and
privatization. Part IV examines how the Court has redefined the scope of
rights and judicial review in development decisions, and how its decisions
have reshaped development narratives and created new development
governance structures that impact the terrain of rights. Part V concludes by
considering the implications of the Court’s approach to adjudicating
globalization policies for the future of rights advocacy and litigation in
India.
II.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE TERRAIN OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN INDIA

As India’s economy underwent major transformation in the 1990s and
early 2000s, the Supreme Court’s approach to the interpretation of
fundamental rights and application of rights-based scrutiny also
fundamentally changed. In cases involving major rights-based challenges to
economic liberalization, privatization, and development policies in the post1991 era, the Court redefined and adjudicated the scope and meaning of the
core fundamental rights contained in Article 14 (equality before the law),10
Article 19 (speech, assembly, and other freedoms), 11 and Article 21 (life and
9
The Emergency period refers to the period of Emergency rule under Indira Gandhi from 1975 to
1977. Gandhi declared Emergency in 1975, citing both internal and external reasons as justifications.
During this period, the government enacted a series of constitutional amendments and laws that curbed
judicial power and repressed rights and freedoms. See generally GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 391–94 (1999).
10
Article 14 provides: “Equality before law-- The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” INDIA CONST. art. 14.
11
Article 19, § 1 provides: (1) All citizens shall have the right –
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assembly peaceable and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) to acquire, hold, and dispose of private property (repealed by 44th Amendment)
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.” Id. art. 19.
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liberty) of the Indian Constitution.12 The Court dramatically expanded the
scope of these rights in the post-Emergency era to create a new arsenal of
rights-based frameworks of scrutiny, along with a new regime of public
interest litigation aimed at correcting human rights and governance
failures.13 However, as this Part illustrates, since the 1990s the Court has
reinterpreted and arguably restricted the scope of these rights, and modified
the nature of rights-based scrutiny in the realm of globalization policies.
A.

The Birth of Fundamental Rights in the Post-Emergency Era

Following the conclusion of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime in
1977 and the election of the Janata party regime in 1977, the Supreme Court
of India launched a new activism and expanded the scope of the fundamental
rights contained in Articles 14, 19, and 21.14 In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India (1978), the Court held that the rights contained in each of these
Articles were inter-related; in subsequent decisions, the Court suggested that
these rights were inviolable basic features of the Constitution. 15 The Indian
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of judicial review under Article
14’s equality guarantee, read together with the rights in Article 19 and 21,
reflects the particular normative worldviews of judges regarding both their
institutional role in judicial review of government economic policy, as well
as their broader understandings of the proper role of government in
economic policy. 16
In reinterpreting the scope of these rights provisions, the Court also
constructed new and more robust standards of rights-based scrutiny. In the
landmark decision Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court
12

Article 21 provides: “No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.” Id. art. 21.
13
See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of
India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 128 (1985) [hereinafter Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously].
14
See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS (1980); Baxi, Taking
Suffering Seriously, supra note 13, at 128; S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING
BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS 110–22 (2002).
15
Justice Chandrachud’s lead opinion in Minerva Mills v. Union of India suggested that Articles 14,
19, and 21 constituted a “golden triangle” of rights that were part of the basic features of the Constitution.
Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206, 255. See also I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. (1999) 7
SCC 580, 581–83 (reaffirming that the golden triangle of Article 14, 19 and 21 is part of the basic
structure)
16
See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 13, at 128 (1985); SATHE, supra note 14, at 165–
66 (2002); Manoj Mate, Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India, in
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 262–86 (Diana Kapiszewski et al.
eds., 2013); Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest
Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 175, 179–209 (2010).
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rejected its earlier decision in Gopalan by effectively reading in substantive
due process into the term “procedure established by law” in Article 21, and
recognized a new standard of non-arbitrariness review based on Article 14
and Article 21.17 Under this new interpretive approach, the Court began to
recognize a wide range of fundamental rights based on both the right to life
and liberty and the rights contained in Article 19. 18 In addition, the Court
held that the rights contained in Articles 19 and 21 were not mutually
exclusive and that deprivation of these rights would be reviewed under the
standard of reasonableness under Article 19. 19
In recognizing a new doctrine of non-arbitrariness, the Court in
Maneka Gandhi radically altered the scope of the right to equality under
Article 14, which had previously been thought to only guarantee equality
and equal protection under the law. 20 Reading Article 21 together with
Article 14, the Court held that the procedures referenced in Article 21’s
protection of life and liberty must be “right and just and fair and not
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.” 21 Under this new standard of “nonarbitrariness” review based on Article 14 and 21, the Court could now
subject government policies and actions infringing on fundamental rights to
a higher level of scrutiny. 22 The Court reiterated and applied this nonarbitrariness standard in later cases like Ajay Hasia v. Khalid M. Sehravadi,
17

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 283; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,
[1950] SCR 88; P. Jain, The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA 1, 23–26 (S.K. Verma & Kusum eds., 2000). In drafting Article 21, the Constituent
Assembly adopted the language “No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law” in order to avoid the possibility of judicially created doctrines of substantive
due process and judicial activism in challenging government policies. However, by expansively
interpreting Articles 14 and 21 together, the Court in Maneka effectively introduced substantive due
process into the Indian Constitution. See Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of
Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases , 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216 (2010)
[hereinafter Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India].
18
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248 (recognizing broad scope of the right to
life and liberty under a substantive due process conception of Article 21. See also Hussainara Khatoon v.
State of Bihar, (1979) SC 1377; Francis Mullin v. Administrator Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC
608, 618 (recognizing the right to life); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 463 (right to clean
air); Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 (right to shelter); CERC v Union of
India, (1995) 3 SCC 42 (right to health); Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 (right to
personal liberty includes right to be free of torture).
19
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 284–86.
20
See B.N. Srikrishna, Skinning a Cat, 8 SCC(J) 3 (2005), http://www.ebc india.com/lawyer/
articles/2005_8_3.htm.
21
Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India, supra note 17, at 247 (citing Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 673).
22
See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 283–84 (holding that equality is
antithetical to arbitrariness and articulating a new standard of non-arbitrariness review based on the right to
equality in Article 14).
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R.D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority, and D.S. Nakara v. Union of
India, where the Court applied robust rights-based scrutiny in its review of
government policies under arbitrariness review.23
Building on this expanded interpretation of these rights provisions, the
Court also expanded the scope of its role through the development of public
interest litigation (PIL), wherein the Court expanded standing for third
parties to file public interest suits to challenge government policies,
governance failures, and human rights violations. 24 In the post-Emergency
years, the Court gradually expanded its role in governance, environmental
policy, and human rights cases through PIL. 25 In the process, it not only
recognized a broad array of fundamental rights, but also increasingly
expanded its assertiveness in challenging the Central Government in key
domains, including judicial appointments, corruption, and environmental
governance. 26 But as reflected in subsequent cases, the Court has been
selective in wielding Article 14’s non-arbitrariness review, fashioning a
variant of the “double standard” approach whereby economic and social
policies of the government receive lower, rational-basis type judicial
review. 27
While the Supreme Court of India was building an expansive
infrastructure of fundamental rights in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it also
signaled a distinctly lower and more limited standard of review in the area of
economic and social policy. During the 1980s, the Supreme Court of India
was highly deferential to the government in cases involving challenges to
government economic policies. This is illustrated by the Court’s decision in
R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981), which involved a challenge to the
Gandhi regime’s enactment of the Bearer Bonds Act.28 In R.K. Garg, the
23
See R.D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority, (1979) SCC 489 (applying doctrine of
nonarbitrariness inherent in Articles 14, 19, and 21 to the Bombay Municipal Corporation’s International
Airport Authority’s failure to comply with its own stated standards of eligibility in a notice for tenders for
restaurant/snack bars in Bombay Airport; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid M. Sehravadi, (1981) 1 SCC 722; D.S.
Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, 319.
24
See SATHE, supra note 14, at 205–19. For a discussion on how the Indonesian Constitutional
Court, under the leadership of chief Justice Asshiddiqie, similarly expanded the Indonesian standing
doctrine to encompass third-parties, such as taxpayers and consumers, and to human rights NGOs, see
Stefanus Hendrianto, The Rise and fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial
Leadership in Indonesia, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 490, 517–20 (2016).
25
See id.
26
See Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, supra note 13, at 127–28; Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial
Governance, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 169, 186–96 (2014).
27
See, e.g., In re Special Courts Bill, (1979) 2 SCR 476 (upholding constitutionality of Special
Courts to try emergency offenses in advisory opinion).
28
See R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675.
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Court upheld the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions)
Ordinance Act enacted by the Gandhi Congress regime. This legislation was
enacted by the Executive (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Council of
Ministers) within the Congressional government as an ordinance to deal with
the problem of “black money” (money that had been earned without being
officially reported for tax purposes), and was later passed as an Act by
Parliament. The Act granted immunity from prosecution under the Income
Tax Act to individuals who purchased these bonds with black money, and
forbid any investigation into the source of this money. 29
While endorsing the underlying policy merits of the Bearer Bonds
Act, the Court in R.K. Garg held that the Act’s separate treatment of black
money investors did not violate Article 14 on the grounds that the
classification had a rational basis in supporting the government’s efforts to
channel black money back into the productive sector to promote economic
growth.30 Additionally, the majority held that the Court could not challenge
the morality of particular legislation based on Article 14, and stressed the
need for a deferential, rational-basis mode of review when examining
government economic policies. 31 In so holding, the Court effectively
announced a “double standard” approach, applying the new heightened
standard of Article 14 non-arbitrariness review to claims involving direct
abrogation of fundamental rights, while applying a lower, rational-basis
review to economic policy.
B.

Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review: The Post-Liberalization
Era and Beyond

In the early 1990s, the Congress government of P.V. Narasimha Rao
launched the New Economic Policy, in which the government initiated new
liberalization policies. 32 This included the introduction of policies aimed at
deregulation, liberalization of government licensing regimes, and a shift
toward privatization of government owned enterprises. 33 Following the
adoption of the New Economic Policy, the Supreme Court provided greater
clarity in articulating the scope of judicial review under Article 14 and
Article 21 in a series of decisions involving challenges to privatization of the
29
30
31
32

See id. at 698–700.
See id. at 705–06.
Id.
See SURESH TENDULKAR & T.A. BHAVANI, UNDERSTANDING REFORMS: POST-1991 INDIA 1–5

(2007).
33
See David B. H. Denoon, Cycles in Indian Economic Liberalization, 1966–1996, 31 COMP. POL.
43, 52–55 (1988).
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telecom sector, the privatization and disinvestment of the industrial and
mining sector, and other cases. In most of these cases, the Court upheld and
endorsed the governments’ policies of economic liberalization.
Since the 1990s, and well into the twenty-first century, the Supreme
Court of India has effectively redefined the scope and terrain of the
fundamental rights in a series of decisions involving challenges to
government liberalization and privatization, and development policies. In
calibrating this new “globalization rights infrastructure” and attendant
modes of scrutiny for globalization policies, this article explores three main
facets of the Court’s decision-making and role.
First, the Court has redefined and carefully limited its own role in the
domain of globalization policies based on the justices’ own conceptions of
the proper role of the Court, and their own understanding of the norms and
values that should be advanced in adjudicating globalization cases. In
embracing these particular role conceptions, the Court has effectively
redefined the normative structure and discourse of globalization by
privileging certain norms and values in its adjudication, including norms of
transparency, competitiveness, regulatory independence, and high growth
models of development. In doing so, this article argues that while the Court
has applied a lower and more limited standard of review to globalization
policies, it has effectively deployed rights as “structuring principles” for
adjudicating the fairness, legality, and propriety of government economic
policies and actions involving privatization and disinvestment, rather than
allowing these rights to serve as strong checks on government policies and
actions. In the development context, this article suggests that rights have
been deployed as “substantive-normative principles” that are used to assess
and validate the legality and optimality of development projects and policies
under a highly deferential mode of review. In deploying rights in this way,
the Court has redefined and reshaped the processes and regulatory structures
that govern in these areas.
Second, the Court’s new globalization rights framework has
effectively meant the creation of new “asymmetrical rights terrains” wherein
the rights of certain interests and stakeholders (including private corporate
interests) are privileged above others (labor, farmers, villagers). The Court
has thus restricted the scope of the fundamental rights so as to limit their
promise to laborers, farmers, and others whose rights have been infringed or
diminished by globalization policies, while enhancing the rights of certain
entities including private corporate interests challenging unfair privatization
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and disinvestment policies.
This broader trend includes weakened
recognition of the rights of laborers in challenging privatization and
disinvestment policies, and the rights of farmers and villagers in challenging
large scale development projects.
Third, the Court has fundamentally redefined its own role as an
adjudicator and governance institution in the realm of privatization and
development policies. This article argues that these fundamental shifts in
the Court’s approach to rights-based adjudication, and in its institutional role
in globalization policy provide a lens into broader shifts in the Court’s role
and jurisprudence in the twenty-first century.
III.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
PRIVATIZATION

AND JUDICIAL

REVIEW: LIBERALIZATION

AND

In the area of liberalization and privatization, the Supreme Court of India
has consciously embraced a particular conception of its own role as an
institution in adopting a deferential and limited scope of review of these
policies. Despite its careful delineation of a highly deferential and limited
judicial role in cases involving government policies and actions in economic
policy-making, the Court’s decisions suggest that it has not been neutral
when it comes to the underlying substantive norms behind these policies.
Although the Court has adopted a highly deferential standard of review, its
decisions reveal discursive narratives evincing broad support for the goals of
liberalization and privatization. At the same time, the Court has effectively
sought to advance the normative goals of fairness, transparency,
competitiveness, and a level playing field, while also policing against
corruption. This Part analyzes how the Court has deployed fundamental
rights as “structuring principles” to assess the legality of government
liberalization and privatization policies. It then examines how the Court has
effectively created an “asymmetrical rights terrain” in the domain of
liberalization and privatization policies by privileging certain rights and
interests over others through limitations on public interest litigation and
recognizing corporate rights over labor rights. Finally, it explores how the
Court has played a significant and important role in shaping and overseeing
the regulatory context and in actively policing corruption.
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A.

Rights as Structuring Principles: Deferential and Limited Review

In the early 1990s, the Court adjudicated challenges to a series of
reform policies involving India’s telecom sector.34 In Delhi Science Forum,
the Court adjudicated a challenge to the adoption of the National Telecom
Policy, whereby the government shifted toward privatization of the
industry. 35 Pursuant to this policy, the government issued licenses to
companies that made tender offers for telecom licenses. The Court
ultimately upheld the privatization of the telecom sector. In rejecting
arguments challenging the merits of the underlying policies, the Court held
that it could not question the merits of the policy and that the proper place
for substantive challenges was Parliament and the political process, not the
courts. 36
Notably, the Court in its decision recognized the virtues of a robust
telecom sector as part of the broader shift toward globalization, noting:
Telecommunications has been internationally recognized as a
public utility of strategic importance . . . . Because of the
economic growth and commercial changes in different parts of
the world, need for interconnectivity means that communication
systems have to be compatible with each and other and have to
be actually interconnected. Because of this there is a demand
even in developing countries to have communication system of
international standards. 37
In addition, the Court in Delhi Science Forum took note of the trend toward
privatization of telecom in developed countries, and observed that “[b]y and
large it was realized that this sector needed acceleration because of the
adoption of liberalized economic policy for the economic growth of the
country.” 38

34
In 1991 the Congress regime of P.V. Narasimha Rao launched liberalization reforms that sought to
move India from a socialist to a more open, market-based economy with less government controls,
regulation and state-owned enterprises. Successive governments continued and expanded these policies.
See id.
35
Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405, 410–12. This section draws in part on
the discussion of economic policy decisions in Manoj Mate, Elite Institutionalism and Judicial
Assertiveness in the Supreme Court of India, 28 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 361, 421–24 (2014)
[hereinafter Mate, Elite Institutionalism].
36
Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405, 412.
37
Id. at 411.
38
Id. at 412.
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The Court in Delhi Science Forum sought to refine Article 14’s nonarbitrariness standard for review of government and administrative decisions
involving economic policy. According to the Court, review under this
standard must also be limited to determining whether such decisions are: 1)
made in bad faith; 2) based on irrational or irrelevant considerations; or 3)
made without following the prescribed procedures required under a statute
(illegality). 39 In applying this limited scope of scrutiny, the Court ultimately
upheld the telecom policy as legal and consistent with the Indian Telegraph
Act, and also upheld it on the grounds of reasonableness.
In later cases, the Court was also deferential to subsequent regimes’
disinvestment policies, and further delineated the contours of Article 14 nonarbitrariness and reasonableness review. In BALCO Employees Union v.
Union of India (2001), the Court upheld the government’s disinvestment in
and sale of the Bharat Aluminum Corporation to a private company,
Sterlite. 40 In reaching its decision, the Court held that economic policies
must be reviewed under a highly deferential rational basis scrutiny, and that
courts should limit their review to whether policy decisions are “absolutely
capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable, or violative of constitutional or
statutory provisions.”41 The Court upheld the disinvestment and found that
it had not been shown to be “capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed”
and that the process was completely transparent.42 The majority’s decision
was noteworthy in that it endorsed the need for disinvestment and change in
economic policies.43
Significantly, the Court adopted a restricted approach toward labor
rights and held that the employees of the BALCO union did not have a right
to a hearing prior to the disinvestment of government owned enterprises
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 44 In adopting this approach,
the Court refused to recognize a potentially wider scope of the right of
laborers to challenge government privatization and disinvestment. In
39

Id. at 417–18. The standard applied in Delhi Science Forum drew on the approach applied in Tata
Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 (upholding six licensing decisions under new licensing regime
while striking down two decisions). See also Arun K. Thiruvengadam & Piyush Joshi, Judiciaries as
Crucial Actors in Southern Regulatory systems: A Case Study of Indian Telecom Regulation, 6 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 327, 334–35 (2012).
40
Bharat Aluminum Company, Ltd. Employees Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333, 363
[hereinafter BALCO].
41
Id. at 360 (citing M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1997) 7 SCC 592).
42
BALCO, 2 SCC at 362.
43
Id. at 355.
44
Id. at 363. Article 16 of the Indian Constitution provides for equality of opportunity in
government employment or appointment to government positions. INDIA CONST. art. 16.
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reaching this decision, the Court also observed that workers had some level
of protection in the Shareholders Agreement between the Union of India and
their strategic partner, and also had protection under existing statutes
including the Industrial Dispute Act, which provides that management
(including the new management of BALCO) must provide for collective
bargaining and other rights. 45 However, it should be noted that these labor
rights are statutory, not constitutional rights.
Finally, the Court in BALCO significantly restricted the scope of
public interest litigation challenges in suggesting that PIL had become
increasingly abused by litigants, and that courts should not entertain PILs
challenging the merits of policies. In reiterating and defining these
suggested parameters of PIL, the Court sought to effectively limit the scope
of PIL and the ability of litigants to deploy PIL in private challenges to
government policies. In its decision, the Court noted that it has mainly
entertained PILs involving “violations of Article 21, or of human rights, or
where the litigation has been initiated for the benefit of the poor and the
underprivileged who are unable to come to court due to some
disadvantage.”46
Building on its decisions in Delhi Science Forum and BALCO, the
Court has mostly upheld government policies involving economic
liberalization and privatization.47 However, the Court has been assertive in
invalidating government policies or actions in cases of clear illegality,
unconstitutionality, or corruption. 48 In addition, in defining the scope and
understanding of arbitrariness under Article 14, the Court has also
acknowledged the need to examine business norms in adjudicating whether
government decision-making processes have infirmities in terms of
arbitrariness. For example, in Reliance Airport Developers Ltd. v. Airport
Authority of India (2006), the Court held that accounting or other business
norms and benchmarks should be used in certain cases in order to assess the
fairness and legality of privatization schemes. 49
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BALCO, 2 SCC at 363.
Id. at 381.
47
See Mate, Elite Institutionalism, supra note 35, at 420–25.
48
See, e.g., Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2003) SC 350 (invalidating the
government’s privatization of government oil companies through disinvestment in two of India’s major
petroleum companies based on failure to secure Parliamentary approval).
49
See Reliance Airport Developers Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, (2006) 10 SCC 1.
46
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Globalization and Rights Privileging: Mapping the Asymmetrical
Rights Terrain of Liberalization and Privatization

The Court has effectively created an “asymmetrical rights terrain” in
the domain of economic liberalization and privatization. In articulating the
scope of fundamental rights in economic policy cases, the Supreme Court
has restricted labor rights by holding that laborers do not have strong
constitutional rights to challenge government policies and actions. As
illustrated in BALCO, the Court has restricted workers’ rights to challenge
government policies under a narrow and limited standard of review under
Article 14. In rejecting strong constitutional protections for labor, the Court
has effectively bolstered government efforts to reform India’s labor laws.50
This dynamic is illustrated in Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil
Nadu (2003), in which the Court drew on a series of earlier precedents and
held that employees did not have a constitutional or statutory right to strike
under Articles 19(1) and Article 21. 51 In refusing to recognize constitutional
or statutory rights to strike, the Court relied on the extraordinary harms and
costs to society that result from strikes. 52 The Court in Rangarajan and
other cases actually helped to advance the government’s labor reform
agenda. In the post-2000 era, successive regimes were unable to enact
comprehensive labor market reforms aimed at restricting labor rights
because of opposition from the Left Front (including the communist
parties). 53 However, the Court arguably assisted the Government in this
process by issuing decisions that restricted labor rights.54
In contrast to its more restricted approach to labor rights, the Court
has held that Articles 14, 19, and 21 provide protections for the rights and
interests of private corporate and business entities. This is illustrated by the
Court’s decision in Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road
Development Corporation Ltd. (2007). In Reliance, the Court adjudicated a
challenge to the Maharashtra state government’s floating of global tender for
completion for the Mumbai Trans Harbour Link. 55 The Court interpreted
Article 14 as a “non-discrimination” provision and held that it must be read
in conjunction with both Article 21 and Article 19 of the Constitution.
50
51
52
53
54
55

See TENDULKAR & BHAVANI, supra note 32, at 145–46.
T.K. Rangarajan v. Gov’t of Tamil Nadu, (2003) 6 SCC 581, 589–92.
Id. at 591–92.
See TENDULKAR & BHAVANI, supra note 32, at 148.
Id.
Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corp. Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 1, 7–8.
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According to the Court, Article 21’s protection for the “right to life” also
included protections for “opportunity.” The Court thus held that Article
19(1)(g), which guarantees a “fundamental right to carry on business to a
company,” also gives rise to the “level playing field” doctrine for private
businesses that “provides space within which equally placed competitors are
allowed to bid so as to subserve the larger public interest.” 56 Justice
Kapadia grounded the level playing field concept in a globalization
rationale, noting that “[g]lobalisation, in essence is liberalization of trade . . .
. Decisions or acts which result in unequal and discriminatory treatment,
would violate the doctrine of ‘level playing field’ embodied in Article
19(1)(g).”57
Because the Maharashtra state government failed to clearly specify
the accounting norms for calculating the net cash profit for a designated
number of years, which was one of the criteria specified in the tender
conditions, the government’s decision to exclude business entities based on
that failure violated Article 14 and 19. The Court ordered that appellants
Reliance Energy Ltd. and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company
Ltd. be allowed to participate again in the bidding process.58
Interestingly, even in contexts where the Court has refused to
recognize fundamental rights to carry on business under Article 19, recent
decisions suggest that the logic of globalization itself may influence how
judges interpret the scope and nature of the private business rights under
Article 19. For example, in a 2004 decision, State of Punjab v. Devans
Modern Breweries Ltd., 59 a five judge constitutional bench adjudicated a set
of appeals arising out of a constitutional reference made by a three judge
bench as to whether state governments were permitted to impose taxes on
the sale of liquor and whether such taxes violated rights under Article 301
and Article 19(1)(g).60 Applying the doctrine of “[r]es extra commercium,”
a three-judge majority of the Court reaffirmed its earlier jurisprudence that
because rights to trade or sell liquor are part of the state’s privilege and
within the purview of the state’s police power, there is no fundamental right
56

Id. at 21.
Id.
58
Id. at 21, 32.
59
State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26.
60
Id. at 99–101. Article 301 states, “[f]reedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Subject to the
other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be
free.” INDIA CONST. art. 301. Article 19(1)(g) provides that all citizens shall have the right “to practice any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business.” Id. art. 19(1)(g).
57
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to trade or sell liquor under Article 301 or Article 19(1)(g).61 Under the res
extra commercium doctrine, the state has the power to restrict fundamental
rights in order to prohibit activities that are considered immoral, criminal, or
injurious to the public health, safety, and welfare.62 The majority thus held
that rights-based challenges under Articles 19 and Article 14 (equality and
non-arbitrariness) could not be brought against state taxes on liquor. 63 In
contrast, two dissenting opinions by Justices B.N. Agrawal and Justice Sinha
rejected the applicability of the res extra commercium doctrine and held that
the trade or sale of liquor is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) and
Article 301. 64
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Sinha went further by suggesting
that broader social and economic changes brought on by globalization
should inform the Court’s approach to interpreting Article 19 and observed:
Globalisation has brought a radical change in the economic and
social landscape of the country . . . . As and when occasion
arises the interface between the globalisation and
constitutionalism whether from economic perspective or human
rights perspective is required to be seriously gone into. The
Court will have to take a realistic view in interpretation of
Constitution having regard to the changing economic
scenario.65
In addition, Sinha argued that global changes in international trade
and liberalization had brought about social changes regarding the perceived
morality of liquor. 66 He also held that the majority should have also
considered the impact of its decision on “global changes and outlook in trade
and commerce.” 67
61

State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26, 108–14.
See Arvind Datar, Privilege, Police Power and Res Extra Commercium—Glaring Conceptual
Errors, 21 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 133, 145–46 (2009), http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/
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See State of Punjab v. Devans Breweries, (2004) 11 SCC 26, 70–76, 84–95, 130–38, 140–48.
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Id. at 145–46.
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Id. at 146 (Sinha, J. dissenting) (“[T]he States are encouraging liberalization to such an extent that
in the near future alcohol beverages may be allowed to be sold in the small grocery shops. . . . The society
has accepted pub culture in the metros. A view in the matter, therefore, is required to be taken having
regard to the changing scenario on the basis of ground reality and not on the basis of the centuries’ old
maxims.”).
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Id. (Sinha, J. dissenting) (“Socialism might have been a catchword from our history. It may be
present in the Preamble of our Constitution. However, due to the liberalization policy adopted by the
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In adjudicating cases involving private broadcasting rights in the postliberalization era, the Court has also suggested that Article 19 provides some
protections to private broadcasters. In the landmark Airwaves case in 1994,
the Court adjudicated a dispute between the Cricket Association of Bengal
and Doordarshan (a publicly owned broadcasting company) over telecasting
rights for the “Hero Cup” international cricket tournament. 68 In its ruling,
the Court recognized that Article 19 encompassed the rights of private
broadcasters to broadcast cricket matches, while at the same time
recognizing that the television airwaves spectrum was a public resource and
that the government-run Doordarshan station could charge licensing fees to
private broadcasters. 69 The Court effectively adopted a middle-ground
approach and held that while Doordarshan should play an important role in
offering free access to cricket matches for the majority of the country
lacking cable access, it should not have a monopoly, and private
broadcasters should also have a right to telecast the event to international
viewers outside of India with cable. 70 In recognizing a “right to
information” based on Article 19, the Court posited that government or
private monopolies in broadcasting would interfere with the right to
broadcast or receive information. 71
It is clear that the Court’s rights jurisprudence in economic policy
cases has created an asymmetrical bias that favors corporate interests and
rights in the adjudicative process. This “asymmetrical rights terrain” reflects
the preeminence and growing importance of private law concepts within
constitutional law in India.72 While Article 14 and 19 have been deployed as
structural principles for evaluating the fairness of processes and statutory
compliance, this process-based norm effectively privileges corporate
interests as the potential beneficiaries of a non-arbitrariness standard under
Article 14 and the Article 19 level playing field standard. The Court has
effectively created a hierarchy of norms in economic and privatization
adjudication by suffusing Article 14 and Article 19 rights-based scrutiny
with normative content, enabling the Court to advance globalization norms
of competitiveness, transparency, and accountability. Corporate interests
Central Government from the early nineties, this view that the Indian society is essentially wedded to
socialism is definitely withering away.”).
68
See The Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal,
(1995) 2 SCC 161 (the Airwaves Case).
69
Id.
70
Id. See also Madhavi Divan, Telecast Tussle: A Sorry Spectacle, (2004) 4 SCC (Jour) 52, 52–54.
71
See The Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal,
(1995) 2 SCC 161.
72
Cf. Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988).
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thus effectively serve as “rights holders” who in the process of challenging
government policies have also become vehicles for vindicating these
globalization norms.
C.

The Court’s Role in Shaping and Monitoring the Regulatory
Landscape

In addition to redefining the scope of rights-based scrutiny, the Court
has played a crucial role in reshaping the regulatory and institutional
landscape of globalization. Two key examples of the Court’s roles are: 1)
catalyzing the creation of independent and autonomous regulatory structures,
and 2) expanding anti-corruption and accountability oversight of
privatization policies.
1.

Catalyzing Creation of Independent and Autonomous Regulatory
Structures and Monitoring and Oversight of Tribunals

The Supreme Court of India has played a crucial role in helping to
catalyze the development of independent regulatory structures. For
example, in the area of telecom regulation, the Court has played a key role in
catalyzing the formation of independent regulatory authorities like the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) 73 and the Telecom Disputes
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT). 74 In Cellular Operators
Association of India v. India (2002), the Court adjudicated an appeal from
the TDSAT in which the tribunal dismissed a challenge to the government’s
approval of the use of “wireless services within the local loop” (WLL)
technology by fixed line operators. The TDSAT dismissed the case on the
grounds that TDSAT did not have the authority to challenge the
government’s decision to approve WLL, as it was a policy decision.75 On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for “reconsideration with
special emphasis on the question of level playing field.” 76 The Court’s
decision ultimately drove the TDSAT to be far more assertive in its scrutiny
of government actions following the decision.77
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Thiruvengadem & Joshi, supra note 39, at 337–38.
Id. at 338 (citing COAI v. Union of India, (2002) 2 Comp. LJ 161; COAI v. Union of India,
(2003) 3 SC 186).
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Id.
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Thiruvengadam and Joshi, supra note 39, at 339 (citing R.U.S. PRASAD, RESOLVING DISPUTES IN
COMMUNICATIONS: GLOBAL PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES (2011)).
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The Court has also played a significant role in applying and advancing
globalization norms of liberalization policies against the orders of tribunals
favoring domestic industries.78 This is illustrated by the Court’s activity in
the area of trade and competition law in cases arising under the Monopolistic
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), including adjudication by the
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC). 79 In
Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers Association (2002),
the Court reversed the decision of the MRTPC in orders in the “Soda Ash”
case and the “Float Glass” case by holding that the MRTPC lacked
jurisdiction to decide the matters, and held that the MRTPC could not act to
restrict imports in these cases. 80 While the MRTPC’s decisions were based
on a protectionist conception of the public interest that was aligned with the
interests of investors and labor, the Supreme Court’s decision privileged a
conception of the public interest that favors corporate and industrial entities
and consumers over the rights and interests of labor. 81
2.

Expanding Anti-Corruption
Privatization

and

Accountability

Oversight

in

While the Court’s exercise of Article 14 non-arbitrariness review has
been heavily restricted and limited, the Court has also greatly expanded its
role as an anti-corruption institution, policing corruption in the processes of
privatization and liberalization. In doing so, the Court has built on its earlier
jurisprudence and record in previous corruption cases including the
landmark Vineet Narain litigation. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, the
Court built on its earlier activism in PIL, broadening its powers to oversee
and monitor government investigations into corruption by employing its
power of “continuing mandamus,” based on the mandamus authority under
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.82 The Court held that under Article
14’s equality provision, the Court was empowered to fill the void left by
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See Sen & Suraj, supra note 8.
Id. at 16 (citing Aditya Bhattacharjea, Indian Competition Policy: An Assessment, 38(34) ECON. &
POL. WEEKLY 3561–74 (2003).
80
Id. (citing Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Mfrs. Assn (2002)).
81
Id.
82
Article 32 of Indian Constitution provides, in relevant part: “Remedies for enforcement of rights
conferred by this Part. — (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to
issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part. INDIA CONST. art 32.
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other institutions in preserving and maintaining the rule of law, and that it
could issue directives and orders to do so under Article 32 and Article 142.83
The Court has thus expanded the scope of its review to directly
impugn and challenge government auctions of public resources including the
2G Telecom Scam Case (2012) and the CoalGate case (2012). 84 In these
cases, the Court has scrutinized the auction processes for allocation of both
the telecom spectrum and coal blocks to private entities based on Article 14
arbitrariness review, while at the same time also playing an active role in
investigating allegations of corruption. 85 These cases illustrate that despite
the narrow and limited scope of judicial review articulated by the Court for
economic policies, the Court continues to play an active role in policing
corruption in privatization and liberalization policies.
IV.

GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: THE COURT’S ROLE
RESHAPING RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURES, AND NARRATIVES

IN

As India shifted toward economic liberalization in the early 1990s, the
Central and State Governments also expanded investment in large-scale
development projects aimed at expanding energy resources and building a
resources infrastructure to support high-growth economic development.
Major examples of this included the construction of hydroelectric plants,
including the Narmada and Tehri Dams, as well the exploration and
development of India’s forests and undeveloped lands for mining and
logging.86 This Part explores how the Supreme Court has adjudicated the
scope and meaning of the fundamental rights as it relates to development.
As noted in Part II, following the post-Emergency era, the Court
dramatically expanded the scope of rights and the permissible scope of court
intervention in public interest litigation cases involving state governance
failures, human rights violations, and other forms of state and private
illegality, including bail undertrials, prison violence, and bonded labor cases.
Building on the right to life in Article 21 and read together with directive
principles setting forth state obligations to protect the environment, the
Court also recognized rights to clean air and water and developed a robust
body of environmental jurisprudence and principles aimed at taking on
83
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widespread environmental degradation. 87 Through environmental public
interest litigation, the Court sought to take on underenforcement of, and
noncompliance with, a set of new environmental laws aimed at protecting
the environment, including India’s water, air, and natural resources,
including rivers and forests. 88
A.

Redefining Rights and the Scope of Judicial Review in Development

With respect to India’s natural resources, forest development, and
accommodation of tribal rights, India’s national development policies have
posed a direct challenge to the framework of fundamental rights and
environmental jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court. As in the
liberalization context, the Court has carved out a highly deferential and
limited standard of review for large-scale development projects. However,
in contrast to the Court’s deployment of rights as structuring principles in
the review of economic policy, the Court in the development context has
deployed rights as “substantive-normative principles” to guide the Court’s
assessment of development policies and programs. In reality, these
substantive-normative principles inform a highly deferential standard of
review that assesses (and largely validates) projects in line with
programmatic goals of national development. At the same time, the Court
has also created an “asymmetrical rights terrain” in the area of development
by selectively privileging certain rights and interests.
This “asymmetrical rights terrain” in development can be traced to the
Court’s embrace of an international law conception of the right to
development, which the Court has deployed so as to effectively subsume
other individual rights. As Balakrishnan Rajagopal observes, informed by
the growing influence and spread of Washington consensus-style
neoliberalism, developed and developing nations have framed their
understanding of the right to development not as a justiciable, negative right,
but rather in terms of the broader programmatic goals of economic
development and growth.89 However, this national goal-oriented conception
of the right elides the actual contestation over the meaning of the right to

87
See generally SHYAM DIVAN AND ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN
INDIA 41–42 (2001); SATHE, supra note 14, at 224–27.
88
See DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ;, supra note 87, at 41–42; SATHE, supra note 14, at 224–27.
89
RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3, at 220–23 (citing G.A. Res.
41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986)).
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development in international law discourse. 90 The UN’s 1968 Declaration
on the Right to Development (Declaration) defined the right to development
as an “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy
economic, social, cultural[,] and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” 91 Consequently, as
Rajagopal argues, the Declaration suggests that individuals, communities,
and social movements also have the right to development as distinct from
state and national development interests. 92
However, the Court’s decisions in the Narmada and Tehri
Dam cases reflect that the Supreme Court has accepted the national goaloriented conception of the right to development. 93 The Court has deployed
this conception of the right to development, as well as principles of
sustainable development based on the right to life under Article 21 as
substantive-normative principles to guide the Court’s assessment of the
constitutionality and legality of government projects. Moreover, in
embracing this conception of the right to development, while Justice
Kirpal’s opinion in the Narmada case acknowledged that there are
“conflicting rights” at play in development projects, the decision subsumes
fundamental rights into the broader programmatic goals of the nation.94 In
doing so, Justice Kirpal’s “conflicting rights” theory weakens and limits the
scope and meaning of fundamental rights protections, preventing them from
serving as a meaningful check on government policy and actions.
In contrast to its decisions involving economic liberalization and
privatization, which were based largely on rights-based principles and
scrutiny grounded in Article 14 and 19, the Court’s decisions in
90
Id. at 221–23. See Tomer Broude, Development Disputes in International Trade, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 32 (Yong-Shik Lee et al., eds., 2011)
(discussing different conceptions of development in international law).
91
Furthermore, Rajagopal argues that the Declaration “implies the full realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination and ‘their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and
resources.’” RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3, at 221.
92
Id.
93
See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Limits of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization: The Indian
Supreme Court and the Narmada Valley Struggle, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 187, 204–05
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, eds., 2005) [hereinafter Rajagopal, The
Limits of Law]; RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 3.
94
See Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 644, 764. See also Rajagopal,
The Limits of Law, supra note 93 at 207 (arguing that the Court’s decision reflects a “legalist/dominant”
script wherein the Court accepted that because existing constitutional and statutory law provided
authorization for the Dam project, the court was prevented the Court from challenging the Dam project on
the basis of fundamental rights violations).
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development cases focused on the rights contained in Article 21, rights
related to sustainable development and ecology, and tribal rights. Similar to
the liberalization and privatization context, the Court has embraced an
understanding of rights that is based on a fundamental asymmetry between
development interests and the rights of farmers and villagers who are
displaced by development. The Court has largely privileged the interests of
the government and the private sector in the name of advancing a vision of
national development, while largely diminishing the individual rights of
farmers, villagers, and tribes.
In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (2000), the Supreme
Court of India adjudicated the legality of the actions of the Central and State
governments relating both to environmental clearances and mitigation and
resettlement of displaced persons resulting from the construction of the
Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River. 95 Although the Court had
originally stayed construction on the project in earlier orders, the Court’s
2000 decision represented a strong endorsement and validation of the project
from a constitutional and legal perspective. The petitioners in Narmada
challenged the terms of the Award issued by the Narmada Water Disputes
Tribunal’s decision of August 16, 1978, which stipulated what the height of
the dam should be, provided “directions regarding submergence, land
acquisition[,] and rehabilitation of the displaced persons,” and “defined the
meaning of the land, oustee[,] and family,” and allocation of the water
between the four main states (Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and
Maharasthra).96
In upholding the project and providing further guidelines for
mitigation and resettling of those displaced by the construction of the dam
project, the Court praised the benefits and virtues of the dam project in terms
of energy production, provision of water, and national development. 97 The
Court relied on the following main rationales in its decision. First, the Court
held that the petitioners’ claims were barred by laches as they had failed to
bring the challenge much earlier following the government’s clearance of
the project in 1987. 98 Second, in recognizing constitutional and statutory
95
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Id. at 686.
97
Id. at 701–04. Rajagopal, The Limits of Law, supra note 93, at 202, 204–05.
98
Id. at 695. See SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND
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authorization for the project, the Court applied a highly deferential standard
of review in determining whether the Government had conducted its
environmental clearance review processes in line with statutory
requirements. 99 In contrast, Justice Bharucha’s dissenting opinion held that
Article 21 required that the government complete a more robust
environmental clearance and review process prior to continuing construction
on the dam. 100 Third, the Court upheld the Government’s resettlement and
rehabilitation policies for those displaced by submergence.
The high level of deference in the Court’s ruling is noteworthy,
especially given that this rationale was cited in BALCO and other cases.
Justice Kirpal’s majority judgment articulated a circumscribed role for
courts in reviewing development, noting:
In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by
the Government the Courts should not become an approval
authority . . . . If a considered policy decision has been taken,
which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will
not be in Public Interest to require the Court to go into and
investigate those areas which are the function of the
executive . . . . 101
In addition, the Court’s decision effectively embraced a restricted
conception of the right to life under Article 21, despite the Court’s earlier
jurisprudence suggesting that Article 21’s protections were quite robust.102
Remarkably, the Court not only endorsed the underlying merits of the dam
project and its benefits, but also held that the fundamental rights of those
displaced by the dam project were not violated because the Relief and
Rehabilitation programs would actually improve the quality of the lives of
those displaced. In reaching its holding, the Court actively embraced a
vision of development and modernization which suggests that displacement,
resettlement, and compensation are far preferable to the status quo of village
existence, thereby diminishing the cultural identity and rights of villagers
and the rural poor. 103 In doing so, the Court held that the relief and
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rehabilitation programs would in the aggregate improve the quality of life of
those displaced by these projects. 104
The Court relied on its earlier decision in the Narmada case in
upholding the government’s policies with respect to the Tehri Dam in N.D.
Jayal v. Union of India (2007) (Tehri Dam case or Jayal).105 In that case,
the Court again adopted a highly deferential standard of review to examine
the government’s compliance with the Environment (Protection) Act’s
requirements, and MoEF’s own clearance requirements. Although a report
from the Hanumatha Rao committee found several violations of the
conditions on which the MoEF had given environmental clearance, and
suggested the need for further studies on the environmental impact of the
project, the Court still upheld the government’s actions under a highly
deferential standard of scrutiny. 106
In addition, the Court in Jayal followed the Narmada case in holding
that the precautionary principle’s requirement of placing the burden of proof
on developing interests was inapplicable to hydroelectric dam projects. 107
The Court in Jayal held that while the right to a clean environment under
Article 21 may serve as a limitation on development projects, based on its
decision Samatha, development itself may be a conceptualized as a right
under Article 21. 108 In discussing the “right to development,” the Court
redefined the scope of Article 21 to bolster and justify government
development policies: “The right to development encompasses much more
than economic well being, and includes within its definition the guarantee of
fundamental human rights. The ‘development’ is not related only to the
growth of GNP.” 109 The Court also cited to Amartya Sen’s Development As
Freedom in which Sen posited that “the issue of development cannot be
separated from the conceptual framework of human right.” 110
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Despite invoking Sen’s human rights-based approach to development,
the Court ultimately upheld the project under a collectivist goal-oriented
conception of development, notwithstanding its impact on the rights of the
rural poor and tribal communities who would be displaced:
The right to development includes the whole spectrum of civil,
cultural, economic, political[,] and social process, for the
improvement of peoples’ well being and realization of their full
potential . . . . Of course, construction of a dam or a mega
project is definitely an attempt to achieve the goal of
wholesome development.111
Finally, the Court in Jayal also upheld the government’s rehabilitation
and relief programs for those displaced by the dam’s construction.
However, in actually reviewing the remediation and relief package, the
Court again was highly deferential in its review, and accepted the
recommendations of the Rao committee without question or challenge.112
B.

Contesting Development Rights and Narratives at the Frontier

Despite the strong endorsement of the merits of development in the
Narmada and Tehri Dam cases, the Court has not always spoken with a
unified voice. This is illustrated by the Court’s decision in Samatha v. State
of A.P. (1997). 113 In that decision, the Court held that under the Fifth
Schedule of the Indian Constitution and the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled
Areas and Land Transfer Regulation Act of 1959, no land or mining leases
in tribal areas could be transferred to non-tribals. The Court’s decision was
a win for tribal self-governance, as the decision held that only the “State
Mineral Development Corporation or a cooperative of the tribal people
could take up mining activity and that too in compliance with the Forest
Conservation Act and the Environment Protection Act.” 114 The Court’s
decision was a strong win for tribal rights, but was also noteworthy for its
discussion of development.
In sharp contrast to the discussion of the right to development in the
Jayal case, the Court in Samatha suggested that the right to development
also must be interpreted in light of the socialist character of India’s
111
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constitution.115 The Court thus held that development required attention to
the promotion and protection of social and economic rights of the poor, of
the dalits (or “scheduled castes”), and of tribes in light of the protections
contained in the directive principles in Articles 38, 39, and 46, which should
inform interpretation of Article 21. 116 Additionally, the Court held that the
object of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution was “not only to
prevent acquisition, holding, or disposal of the land in Scheduled Areas by
the non-tribals from the tribals or alienation of such land among non-tribals
inter se but also to ensure that the tribals remain in possession and
enjoyment of the lands in Scheduled areas for their economic empowerment,
social status and dignity of their person.”117
In other recent decisions, the Court challenged in part the dominant
pro-development narratives that have informed its decisions in the Narmada
and Tehri Dam cases. For example, in Nandini Sundar v. State of
Chattisgarh (2011), the Court held that the state government’s establishment
of the Salwa Judum, an army that included child soldiers recruited to fight
Naxalite rebels, violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In reaching
this decision, the Court cited some of the negative consequences of
globalization and development in India and suggested that globalization
policies had directly led to the rise of violent agitation movements like the
Naxalite movement. 118 Still, while the Court in Sundar embraced a critical
posture toward globalization in India, the discourse of this judgment has not
translated into a broad judicial attack on globalization policies generally.
C.

Development Governance Structures and Governance Narratives: The
Forest Case, Development and Fundamental Rights

In the domain of privatization and liberalization, the Supreme Court
of India has been assertive in recommending or mandating the creation of
independent regulatory bodies to police and regulate liberalization and
privatization policies, including the TRAI. In addition, as illustrated by the
Court’s decisions in the 2G Telecom case and CoalGate case, the Court has
also been assertive in scrutinizing and challenging the processes by which
natural resources are allocated to private interests. In contrast, as illustrated
by the Narmada Dam and Tehri Dam cases, the Court has been far more
deferential to the expertise and judgment of the government’s own executive
115
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agencies, expert committees, and regulatory bodies in their assessments
regarding environmental impact reports and provisions for relief and
rehabilitation of displaced persons.
Despite the Court’s strong pro-tribal and human rights judgment in
Samatha, the Supreme Court has had a mixed record when it comes to the
rights of tribes in cases involving encroachment in India’s forests. In
contrast to the Narmada and Tehri Dam contexts, the Court has been more
far more assertive in recommending, and indeed creating, new governance
structures and bodies in other development contexts in the Godavarman
Forest case litigation. 119 In that context, the Court has established highpowered committees, appointed amicus curiae who have functioned much
like government ministers, and closely monitored state and national
government compliance with the Forest Act and the Court’s own judgments
and orders. Although the Court has received significant praise for its
activism and assertiveness in seeking to protect and conserve India’s forests
in line with the Forest Act and constitutional mandates for environmental
protection, some of the Court’s orders undermined the fundamental rights of
tribes and villagers in India. The Court’s actions in Godavarman v. Union of
India illustrate how by creating parallel court-led bureaucracy aimed at
conservation, the Court itself became an agent of development and
displacement.
In 1996, following the filing of a writ petition aimed at curbing
deforestation of the Nilgiris forest caused by illegal logging, the Court in
Godavarman adopted an expansive definition of the term “forest” in
interpreting the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, and through a series of
orders aimed at curbing logging, mining, and other activities, effectively
took over the management and governance of India’s forests. 120
Significantly, in advancing a particular conception of sustainable
development, this article suggests that the Court-established forest
governance bureaucracy itself became a vehicle for creating a distinct
“asymmetrical rights terrain” in development.
This is illustrated in the series of guidelines issued by the Court and
its committees as part of the complex afforestation management regime
119
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created in the Godavarman case. As part of this regime, and in response to
the MoEF’s own failures to implement Court orders, the Court, with the
support of its own Central Empowered Committee (CEC), issued a series of
guidelines requiring that state governments pay the “net present value”
(NPV) of forest land that was allocated for mining and private development
projects. 121 Funds from the NPV were then supposed to be allocated in
support of afforestation programs. 122 When some state governments were
found to have diverted NPV funds to non-afforestation purposes, the Court
ordered the MoEF to create the Compensatory Afforestation Management
and Planning Agency (CAMPA) in order to manage the funds collected.123
As a result the new CAMPA agency was empowered to bypass state
governments and to use the funds collected to directly fund afforestation
activities by conservation organizations. 124 This court-managed system of
forest governance effectively privileged development interests by
accommodating their activities through a particular model of sustainable
forest development.
While elevating the rights and interests of state governments and
development industries as part of a broader sustainable development model
based on afforestation and compensation, the Court also played a major role
in abrogating the rights of the rural poor and tribal populations in the forests.
In a series of orders in 2001 and 2002, in response to recommendations from
amicus curiae Harish Salve, the Court ordered a series of eviction drives that
resulted in mass displacement of the rural poor and tribal populations that
inhabited and utilized forest land. 125 This portrait of the Court’s forest
governance management regime illustrates how even court-led bureaucracies
can replicate the rights-oppression and displacement of the state.
V.

CONCLUSION

Globalization policies have fundamentally altered the relationship of
the state vis-à-vis the citizens in India. Despite the Supreme Court’s
creation of a robust and expansive rights infrastructure in the immediate
post-Emergency era, the Court has constrained and limited the scope of
fundamental rights, and rights-based judicial scrutiny of globalization
121
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policies in the post-1991 era. This article has suggested that the Court’s
approach to judicial review reflects a unique model of adjudication in which
high courts play an active role in shaping the meaning of rights, regulatory
structure and norms, and the legal-constitutional discourse of globalization.
In reshaping the terrain of rights in the post-liberalization era, the
Court’s role and jurisprudence in adjudicating globalization cases will
continue to have profound consequences for the future of human rights and
environmental protection in India. Major shifts in the Court’s jurisprudential
approach and institutional role present both structural and normative
challenges for the cause of human rights, social justice, and environmental
protection in India. Structurally, the Court’s creation of asymmetrical rights
terrains threatens to weaken the potential role that courts can play in
vindicating and safeguarding the rights of workers, villagers, the urban and
rural poor, and tribal populations most affected by transformational changes
in India’s economy and development of its natural resources. Indeed, both
government and court-led governance structures have largely excluded
channels for those who have been displaced by globalization to block and
resist large-scale development projects.
From a normative standpoint, the Court’s redefinition and reshaping
of the discourse of liberalization, and its reframing of development
narratives, has arguably altered both the regulatory environment, and limited
the scope of meaningful rights advocacy and litigation in the courts. In
embracing a conception of the right to development that is based on national
and centralized planning goals, the Supreme Court’s development
jurisprudence limits the possibility of recognizing meaningful countervailing
rights that can be deployed in opposition to state-led development policies
and projects. This article thus highlights the need for scholars, advocates,
and policy-makers to carefully reassess the Court’s rights jurisprudence, and
the underlying development rights narratives that inform judicial worldviews
and opinions in globalization. The Court’s reframing of rights narratives in
globalization cases threatens to weaken its potential as an oppositional actor
in resisting state development imperatives, and with it, the possibility of a
more humane jurisprudence of globalization rights.

